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B16atrice Vizkelety Discrimination, the Right to Seek
Redress and the Common Law:
A Century-Old Debate*
I. Introduction
Does discrimination law have anything in common with the common
law? This question, which may have been reworded from time to time in
deference to the age in which it was raised, is one which has recurred with
remarkable tenacity throughout most of this century. It is also a question
which continues, despite initial impressions, to be relevant to the manner
in which adjudicatots interpret and apply anti-discrimination legislation
today.
During the first half of the century, it was the very existence of a right
to obtain civil redress for discrimination that was in question. Since
anti-discrimination legislation tended at the time to place emphasis on
penal sanctions rather than on providing adequate compensation for
victims of discrimination, plaintiffs turned to the common law or the civil
law of Quebec in the hope of finding a means of redress through the
courts. Although it has been said that "in none of these early cases did the
court question the cause of action per se",1 in practical terms, it is more
accurate to say that the plaintiffs right to sue for discrimination was a
hollow right for these actions almost always met with failure. Where on
rare occasions a court was sympathetic to the plaintiff's plight, the
opinion "turned out to be a lone voice crying in a judicial wilderness".2
Thus it is generally agreed that the common law did little during this
period to protect egalitarian values and that, with but a few exceptions, the
courts were unresponsive to claims for injury based on discrimination.
According to one commentator, "by 1940, it was clear that Canadian
courts regarded racial discrimination as neither immoral nor illegal, and
apart from a tenuous claim to breach of contract in special circumstances,
the victim of discrimination could obtain no redress, however flagrant the
discriminatory act."3
* This article is a revised version of a paper that was presented at the Canadian Institute For
the Administration of Justice, October 11-14, 1989, Kananaskis Village, Alberta.
1. I. A. Hunter, "Civil Actions for Discrimination", [1977] 55 Can. Bar Rev. 106, p. 111.
2. I.A. Hunter,"Human Rights Legislation in Canada: Its Origin, Development and
Interpretation" (1976), 15 U.W.O.L.Rev. 21, p. 23. The reference is to the 1899 decision in
Johnson v. Sparrow, [1899] S.C. 104.
3. Ibid., p. 24 .
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In reaction to the failuie of the common law to provide adequate
remedies for wrongs resulting from discrimination, legislatures began
during the 1960s and 1970s to enact human rights laws as we know them
today.4 By 1977 every jurisdiction in Canada, including the ten provinces,
the federal Parliament, the Northwest Territories and the Yukon,5 had
introduced anti-discrimination legislation prohibiting discrimination in
areas such as housing, employment, and services customarily offered to
the public. These laws also provided specific enforcement mechanisms
enabling victims of discrimination to obtain a civil remedy for the injury
that they had suffered. Of particular interest is the fact that, in every
jurisdiction but Quebec, the enforcement of human rights legislation in
first instance 6 was confided to specialized tribunals or boards of inquiry,
and not to the courts.
But the legislation remained unclear as to whether individuals could
choose, if they so desired, to exercise a private right of action instead of
following the enforcement mechanism created by statute. In the late
1970s, a woman of East Indian origin decided to bypass the administrative
and quasi-judicial procedures established under the Ontario Human
Rights Code and to take a court action against a college,7 alleging that its
hiring practices were tainted by racial discrimination. The case revived
certain issues left dormant by the enactment of human rights legislation.
The debate now focussed on whether private civil actions for discrimination
could co-exist with the enforcement scheme provided by the Ontario
Human Rights Code.
4. For a description of the legislative history of anti-discrimination legislation in Canada, see
W. S. Tarnopolsky and W. F. Pentney, Discrimination Law in Canada (Toronto: Richard
DeBoo Ltd., revised ed., 1985).
5. The Canadian Human RightsAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6; the British Columbia Human Rights
Act, S.B.C. 1984, c. 22; NorthwestTerritories FairPracticesAct, R.S.N.W.T. 1974, c. F-2; the
Yukon Territory Human RightsAct, S.Y. 1987, c. 3; The Alberta Individual's Rights Protection
Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. 1-2, S.A. 1985; the Saskatchewan Human Rights' Code, R.S.S. 1978, c.
S-24.1; the Manitoba"Human Rights Code," R.S.M. 1987, c. H175; the Ontario Human Rights
Code, 1981, S.O. 1981, c. 53; the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q.
1977, c. C-12; the New Brunswick Human Rights Code, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. H-11; the Nova
ScotiaHuman RightsAct, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 214; the Prince Edward Island Human Rights Act,
S.P.E.I. 1988, c. H-12; the Newfoundland Human Rights Code, 1981, S.N. 1988, c. 62.
6. In some cases the law provides a right of appeal before the ordinary courts: e.g. B.C., s.
17(4); Alta., s. 33; Sask., s. 32(1); Ont., s. 41; N.S., s. 36(1); Nfld., s. 31; N.W.T., s. 8.
7. Bhadauria v. Board of Governors of Seneca ofAppliedArts and Technology (1980), 27 O.R.
141 (Ont. S.C.).
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At first, this option appeared to have some judicial support. The
Ontario Court of Appeal chose, in Bhadauria v. Board of Governors of
Seneca college ofAppliedArts and Technology,8to recognize the plaintiff's
right to sue for discrimination. Madam Justice Bertha Wilson did "not
regard the Code as in any way impeding the appropriate development of
the common law in this important area",9and concludedthatdiscrimination
,did indeed give rise to a cause of action at common law. But this parallel
right of action did not survive beyond the appeal. Largely influenced by
the comprehensive procedural scheme laid out under the Ontario Human
Rights Code, 10 the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously rejected'1 this
"bold" attempt to "advance the common law."12 Speaking for the Court,
Chief Justice Laskin declared:
[N]ot only does the Code foreclose any civil action based directly upon a
breach thereof but it also excludes any common law action based on an
invocation of the public policy expressed in the Code."
As a result of the Court's refusal to recognize a common law tort of
discrimination and also the right to sue upon a breach of the Ontario
Human Rights Code, the debate regarding the existence of a private civil
action for discrimination quickly lost its fervour.
Still, the decision leaves us in a quandary as to some issues and, while
Bhadauria has its supporters, the decision has also become the target of
criticism. For instance, while those who opposed the Court of Appeal
decision found it "very difficult to perceive why [it would be] appropriate
to establish a co-existent common law right and remedy alongside a
statutory Code", 14 others protested against the Supreme Court of Canada's
"judicial shortsightedness" in reversing the lower court ruling and
8. 105 D.L.R. (3d) 707.
9. Ibid., p.715.
10. The Ontario Human Rights Code sets out a mechanism for the investigation and settlement
of complaints. The government is further given the discretionary authority to decide whether
it will proceed with the complaint before a board of inquiry for adjudication.
11. (1981), 124 D.L.R. (3d) 193.
12. Per Laskin, C.J., ibid., p. 194.
13. Ibid., p. 195.
14. P.S.A. Lamek, Canadian Bar Association (Ontario), Fifth Annual Institute of Continuing
Education, April 1980, as quoted in I.B. McKenna, "A Common Law Action forDiscrimination
inJobApplications" (1982),60 Can. BarRev. 122,p. 125. Seealso, D.J. Mullan,'Developments
in Administrative Law: the 1980-81 Term" (1982), 3 Sup. Ct. L Rev. 1.
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denying the availability of a civil right of action.15 Lamenting "the trouble
with Bhadauria", 16 another commentator has recommended that the right
to sue before the courts be considered as a means of improving existing
human rights legislation. The proposals for legislative reform which have
followed Bhadauria may indeed serve to rekindle a new debate: "Why
not now simply amend the Code to provide a tort remedy at the appropriate
stage...?'
17
If we are to avoid the risk of confusion, it is necessary at this stage of
the debate to distinguish between two separate issues raised byBhadauria
and the various commentaries that were written in response to it. The first,
of a substantive nature, concerns the degree to which the common law can
reasonably be expected to enhance and contribute to the effective
development of the right to nondiscrimination. Recent developments in
discrimination law suggest that there are important distinctions to be
made between the approach to discrimination law and the traditional
approach of the common law on an ever-growing list of issues. For
instance, there are marked differences in the manner in which
discrimination law and the common law respectively deal with public
policy, the concept of fault, commercial freedom, and issues relating to
remedies such as the right to seek reinstatement in employment. These
differences merit attention not only in assessing the desirability of having
a legislatively created tort for discrimination, as some authors have
recommended, but also in order to achieve a better understanding of the
relationship between these two areas of law and to establish whether their
respective principles are necessarily interchangeable. The issue is also
worth addressing because of the tendency of adjudicators, and especially
the courts, to resort to common law principles when interpreting and
applying human rights legislation without considering whether they are
in fact relevant to the legislation and whether they can or should be
transplanted into a case involving discrimination.
15. I. A. Hunter, "The Stillborn Tort of Discrimination" (1982), 14 Ottawa L Rev. 219, p. 226 .
See also, M. E. Baird, "Pushpa Bhadauria v. the Board of Governors of The Seneca College
ofAppliedArts andTechnology: ACaseComment" (1981), 39 Tor. Fac. L Rev. 96; D. Gibson,
"The New Tort of Discrimination: A Blessed Event for the Great Grandmother of Torts"
(1979), 11 C.C.LT. 141; H. Kopyto, "The Bhadauria Case: The Denial of the Right to Sue for
Discrimination" (1982), 7 Queen'sL J. 144, and McKenna, ibid. Also, see Aziz v. Adamson
(1979), 11 C.C.LT. 134 (Ont.S.Ct.) (Linden J.), and A. M. Linden, Canadian Tort Law,
(Toronto: Butterworths, 4th ed., 1988), pp. 300-301.
16. Ken Norman, "Problems in Human Rights Legislation and Administration", in S. L.
Martin and K. E. Mahoney, eds., Equality and Judicial Neutrality, (Toronto: Carswell Co.,
1987), p. 398 ff. Also, see Equality Now: Report of The Special Committee on Visible
Minorities in Canadian Society, March 1984, p. 138. According to Recommendation 43,
complainants should have the option of instituting a civil action against a discriminator if they
do not wish to go through the complaint procedure available at the Canadian Human Rights
Commission.
17. Hunter, supra note 15.
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The secondpoint concerns theprocedural consequences of Bhadauria,
which confirmed the exclusive jurisdiction of the Ontario Human Rights
Commission to decide, on a discretionary basis, whether a complaint
should be taken before a board of inquiry for adjudication when parties
fail to settle. Since complainants are not entitled to pursue the matter
without the support and approval of the Human Rights Commission, this
enforcement system is one which, to put it simply, makes the right to seek
redress in cases of discrimination dependent on government authorization.
It may be asked whether such an approach to the enforcement of human
rights legislation, which is applicable everywhere in Canada but Quebec,
is still justified today, particularly in light of the Supreme Court of Canada
decision in Syndicat des employ~s de production du Qudbec et de
l'Acadie v. Canadian Human Rights Commission, 18 which recognized
that while human rights commissions may have the duty to act fairly, they
are not required to provide parties with a full right to be heard according
to the rules of natural justice.
I do not propose to find a complete and definite solution to a debate that
has captured the attention of experts in the area for so long. Nor is it the
purpose of this commentary to test the potential of the common law as a
possible vehicle for the enforcement of the right to nondiscrimination at
some future date - a topic which will be left for others to explore; the
objective here is simply to consider the effective and coherent development
of existing anti-discrimination legislation. What I intend, therefore, is to
take a bird's-eye view of developments in discrimination law and to
comment them in light of certain well-established principles of the
common law in the hope of shedding some light on the relationship
between the two areas of law as they stand today. This part of the
commentary will then be followed by a brief look at the vexing question
of the exclusive jurisdiction that human rights commissions and tribunals
now have, except in Quebec, with respect to complaints of discrimination.
The experience in Quebec, which is quite different from that of other
Canadian jurisdictions, merits a few words before embarking on this
analysis. A fundamental difference between the two approaches is best
understood by noting that Bhadauria has been rejected by Quebec law.
In Blanchette c. La Compagnie d'Assurance du Canada sur la Vie, 19 the
Quebec Superior Court simply declared that: "[i]l n'est pas possible de
transposer cette solution au Qu6bec. ''20 This 1984 decision confimned a
18. [198912 S.C.R. 879.
19. [19841 C.S. 1240 (Qu.C.S.)
20. Ibid., p. 124 2.
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widely held view in the province that discrimination is a delict under the
Civil Code of Lower Canada. Although legal commentators are no longer
unanimous on this point and some have begun to challenge the soundness
of this premise,21 the courts have not yet revised their position on the
matter. The idea that discrimination is a delict under Quebec law
continues, therefore, to exert considerable influence on the interpretation
and the application of the law of nondiscrimination in this province.
The procedural approach is also quite different. Under the Charter of
Human Rights and Freedoms of 1975, the enforcement of the law was left
in the hands of the ordinary courts,22 and it was only in 1989 that the
Quebec National Assembly decided to create a specialized Human Rights
Tribunal.23 Also, the Quebec Human Rights Commission does not have
the exclusive jurisdiction to deal with human rights complaints, as will
later be seen. Far from being irrelevant, these distinctive characteristics
of the law in Quebec will provide a useful basis for comparison in the
pages that follow.
II. Equality Rights, the Common Law and the Civil Law of Quebec: A
Matter of Irreconcilable Differences?
1. Public policy
During a large part of the century, discrimination was not regarded as
contrary to public policy under the common law. The case of Re
Drummond Wren,24 which gave support to egalitarian values on the
grounds of public policy, was the "solitary beacon" 5 which failed to
21. This is especially noticeable in commentaries dealing with constitutional principles and
litigation: see, for example, Rend Dussault and Louis Borgeat, Traitf de droit administratif,
(Qu6bec: Les Presses de l'Universit6 Laval, 2nd ed. vol. m, 1989), pp.740 and 750 note 143;
Didier Lluelles and Pierre Trudel, 'L'application de la Charte canadienne des droits et libert6s
aux rapports de droit priv6", La Charte canadienne des droits et libertis: Concepts et impacts
(1984), 18 Revue juridique Thimis 219, p. 249, and Ghislain Otis, "Le spectre d'une
marginalisation des voies de recours d6coulant de la Charte qudbecoise" (1991), 51 Revue du
Barreau 561, p.5 67.
Contra: M.Caron, "Le droit a'6galit6 dans le Code civil et dans laCharte qu6becoise des droits
et libert~s", (1985) 45 Revue du Barreau 345, p. 352; P.-G. Jobin, "La violation d'une loi ou
d'un r~glement entraine-t-elle la responsabilitd civile ?", (1984) 44 Revue du Barreau 222,
223-224; K. De wade, " Les articles 49 et 52 de la Charte quibeeoise des droits et libertis:
recours et sanctions -i l'encontre d'une violation des droits et libert6s garantis par ]a Charte
qu~becoise", in Application des Chartes des droits et libertis en mati~re civile, 1988, p. 122,
H. Wolde-Giorghis, "Le fardeau de la preuve en mati~re de discrimination" (1987), 21 Revue
Juridique Thimis 169, p. 185.
22. 1975 S.Q. c. 6, assented to June 27, 1975, and promulgated June 28, 1976: ss. 49 and 83.
23. S. 100 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-12, as
amended by 1989 S.Q.c. 51, s.16.
24. [1945] O.R. 778.
25. Mullan, supra, note 15, p. 7, note 25.
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affect the prevailing view that "[t]he sanctity of contract is a matter of
public policy which we should strive to maintain.
'26
It has been suggested that with time the civil law of Quebec became
more receptive to the idea that discrimination violated public order and
good morals.27 However, the 1963 case of Whitfield v. Canadian
Marconi Co.,25 involving an individual who was dismissed from his
position as an electrician after having broken company policy prohibiting
"fraternization" with the native population in surrounding villages,
illustrates the high level of tolerance for discrimination under this system
as well. Rejecting the argument that the employment contract should be
annulled as contrary to public order, the Quebec Court of Appeal in
Marconi declared:
In my opinion the private agreement between Whitfield and Canadian
Marconi Company providing that, as a general rule, Whitfield would not
go to the neighbouring Indian or Eskimo villages and would not associate
with the native population does not contravene any laws of public order or
good morals.29
Indeed, one is more likely to find instances where public order was
used by the courts to uphold discriminatory practices, as can be seen from
case of Langstaff concerning the refusal to admit women to the Quebec
Bar in the early part of this century: "to admit a woman and more
particularly a married woman as a barrister [ ... ] would be nothing short
of a direct infringement upon public order". 0
Be that as it may, under existing human rights legislation, the law has
evolved considerably and it is generally agreed that anti-discrimination
legislation is clearly a matter of public policy. In Ontario Human Rights
Commission v. Etobicoke,3" the Supreme Court of Canada declared that
parties cannot opt out of human rights legislation by means of a private
contract, including collective agreements. The "quasi-constitutional" or
"special nature" of human rights legislation gives it primacy over other
legislation 2 and, at the very least, "clear legislative pronouncement'" is
required where the legislature wishes to alter, amend, repeal or otherwise
introduce exceptions to such laws.33
26. Re Noble and Wolf [1949] 4 D.L.R. 375, p. 390.
27. Gooding v. Edlow, 11966] C.S. 436, and John Murdock Limitie v. La Commission de
Relations ouvri~res de la province de Quebec, [1956] C.S. 30.
28. [1968] B.R. 92.
29. Ibid., p. 95.
30. Langstaff v. The Bar of the Province of Quebec (1915), 47 C.S. 131, p.137.
31. [1982] 1 S.C.R. 202.
32. In most jurisdictions the legislature has expressly recognized the paramountcy of human
rights legislation: B.C., s. 22(2); Alta., s. 1; Sask., s.44; Man., s. 58; Ont., s. 46(2); Que., s.52;
P.E.I., s. 1(2); Nfld., s.6.
33. Winnipeg School Division No. I v. Craton, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 150, p. 156.
Discrimination, the Right to Seek Redress and the Common Law
Developments such as these led at least one commentator to suggest
that the earlier rulings were a thing of the past and that "social and judicial
attitudes about discrimination have radically changed with the passing
years".34
However, contrary to such expectations, the common law has been
slow to react to changes in the law of discrimination. The decision in first
instance in Canada Trust Co. v. Ontario Human Rights Commission
35
involving a restrictive covenant in a scholarship trust document serves to
illustrate this point. In issue was whether the covenant, written in 1923,
which excluded from the management of the trust as well as its benefits
"all who are not Christians of the White Race, all who are not of British
Nationality or of British Parentage.. .", was contrary to public policy
under the common law.36 Reluctant to disturb the principle of testamentary
freedom on the basis of a "vague and unsatisfactory term" such as public
policy, the Supreme Court of Ontario upheld the trust document in its
entirety. It rejected public policy arguments on the grounds that this was
"a doctrine to be invoked only in a clear case in which the harm to the
public is substantially incontestable, and does not depend upon the
'idiosyncratic inferences of a few judicial minds" 37 The Ontario Court
of Appeal disagreed. In determining whether or not the trust was in
violation of public policy, the Court relied in part on an assessment of
"values commonly agreed upon in society":
The widespread criticism of the Foundation by human rights bodies, the
press, the clergy, the university community, and the general community
serves to demonstrate how far out of keeping the trust now is with
prevailing ideas and standards of racial and religious tolerance and
equality and, indeed, how offensive its terms are to fair-minded citizens. 8
This part of the test based on public outrage, which seems to give much
weight to social attitudes, raises an interesting issue. If the need to
demonstrate "widespread criticism" is to be the basis on which a violation
of public policy is found, the test may be unduly restrictive and unreliable.
Even if one admits that social attitudes have evolved and that most
individuals now recognize that racial and religious discrimination
constitute reprehensible forms of behaviour, experience teaches us that
34. Hunter, supra, note 1, p. 110.
35. (1988), 9 C.H.R.R. D/4506 (S.Ct. Ont.)
36. It was found that the matterhad properly been brought before the ordinary courts rather than
before the Ontario Human Rights Commission, because it involved "the administration of a
trust, over which superior courts have had inherentjurisdiction for centuries and, in particular,
with respect to charitable or public trusts." (1990), 12 C.H.R.R. D/184 (Ont.C.A.), p.195.
37. Supra, note 35, p. 4514. For a criticism of this decision, see J.C. Shepherd, "When the
Common Law Fails", (1989) 9 Estates and Trusts Journal 117.
38. Supra, note 36, p. 191.
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public opinion and sympathy can all too easily shift according to the
mood of the day and the popularity of a given cause. Also, while most
individuals possess a sense of justice, their conception of the good can
easily be clouded by personal interests. It is tempting in this respect to
recall what Bertrand Russell has described as "cat-and-mouse ethics."
"Sympathy," he said, "is the universalising force in ethics [.. . Sympathy
is in some degree instinctive: a child may be made unhappy by another
child's cry. But limitations of sympathy are also natural. The cat has no
sympathy for the mouse; the Romans had no sympathy for any animals
except elephants; the Nazis have none for Jews [... ] Where there is
limitation of sympathy there is a corresponding limitation in the conception
of the good: the good becomes something to be enjoyed only by the
magnanimous man, or only by the superman, or the Aryan ... All these
are cat-and-mouse ethics.
'39
Therefore, laws against discrimination and the policies on which they
are based, may well provide a more reliable standard on which to
determine what is or is not a matter of public policy. After all, human
rights legislation does not, as one author put it, merely reflect "the
common level of morality or accepted standards of social behaviour
prevalent in the community; it must be regarded as a positive directing
force, which can be used as an instrument of social progress."4 In any
event, the concurring decision in Canada Trust appears to accept that
public policy is not only determined on the basis of community sentiment
but also in light of laws and official documents: "it is gleaned from a
variety of sources, including provincial and federal statutes, official
declarations of government policy, and the Constitution.
41
In Quebec, the legislature did not leave it to the judiciary to define
public order nor are the courts required to scrutinize community sentiment
in this regard. Influenced by the wording of the public order and good
morals section of the Civil Code of Lower Canada,42 Section 13 of the
Quebec CharterofHumanRights and Freedoms states that discriminatory
clauses in contracts or other juridical acts are deemed null and void:
13. No one may in ajuridical act stipulate aclauseinvolving discrimination.
Such a clause is deemed without effect.
39. B. Russell, Power, (London: Unwin Books, 1975), p. 169.
40. D. Lloyd, The Idea ofLaw, (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1981), p. 143.
41. Supra, note 36, p. 198.
42. Which reads as follows:
13. No one can by private agreement, validly contravene the laws of public order and
good morals.
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Inspired by this provision, the Quebec Court of Appeal once remarked:
"Les droits reconnus dans la Charte sont plus que des 'conditions de
travail', ils sont des 'conditions de vie en soci&6'."'43 The same court
agreed on the basis of section 13 of the Quebec Charter and long before
the recent Supreme Court of Canada rulings on a similar point,' that an
arbitrator had the power to annul a discriminatory clause in a collective
agreement.45
In both Quebec and other jurisdictions, it would appear therefore that
the right to equality has respectively become a matter of public order and
public policy not through any major breakthrough in the civil law of
Quebec or the common law but directly as a result of anti-discrimination
legislation and most probably also because equality is now a
constitutionally protected value.
2. Standard of Liability
Another crucial question is whether the elements of liability for
discrimination are compatible with the standards of liability in tort law or
that of delict?
An important obstacle to fitting discrimination into the mould that has
been shaped by the laws regarding civil liability, is that it has become
increasingly evident that the element of "fault" is not a prerequisite to
proving discrimination. The relevance of fault in this context was
questioned by the Supreme Court of Canada in Robichaud v. Canada
(Treasury Board),46 where LaForest J. remarked that "the Act [.. .] is not
aimed at determining fault or punishing conduct. It is remedial. Its aim is
to identify and eliminate discrimination.47 While it is true that this case
dealt with the specific issue of the employer's liability for the acts of its
employees, the statement has broader implications. Not only does it
provide a succinct description of the Supreme Court of Canada's approach
to discrimination law, it also situates recent developments in relation to
other areas of law, particularly the common law:
43. Ateliers d'ing~nierie Dominion Ltie v. Commission des droits de la personne du Qudbec,
[1980] R.P.209, p. 216.
44. Douglas College v. DouglaslKwantlen Faculty Association, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 570;
Thtreault-Gadoury v. Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission), [1991] 2 S.C.R.
22; Cuddy Chicks Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 5.
45. Union des employis de commerce v. W.E.Bigin Inc., J.E. 84-65:
Le Tribunal d'arbitrage avaitjuridiction [...] pour interprter et appliquer la Charte des
droits et libertis de la personne qui est une loi d'ordre public dont on ne peut d6roger
contractuellement.
46. [1987] 2 S.C.R. 84.
47. Ibid., p. 92.
314 The Dalhousie Law Journal
The last observation also goes some way towards disposing of the theory
that the liability of an employer ought to be based on vicarious liability
developed under the law of tort[... ] It is clear, however, that that limitation,
as developed under the doctrine of vicarious liability in tort cannot
meaningfully be applied to the present statutory scheme."
The 1985 decision of O'Malley v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd. 49constituted a
turning point when the Supreme Court of Canada laid the foundation for
an approach to discrimination based not on "intent" but "effect":
The Code aims at the removal of discrimination. This is to state the
obvious. Its main approach, however, is not to punish the discriminator,
but rather to provide relief for the victims of discrimination. It is the result
or the effect of the action complained of which is significant. If it does, in
fact, cause discrimination; if its effect is to impose on one person or group
of persons obligations, penalties or restrictive conditions not imposed on
other members of the community, it is discriminatory. 0
Since O'Malley, it is recognized that there are at least three different
methods of proving discrimination: i) direct discrimination; ii) adverse
effect discrimination, and iii) systemic discrimination. The definitions of
each of these different forms of discrimination provide the elements that
are necessary to make out the plaintiff's case. The choice of one or the
other of these methods of proof will, of course, depend on the facts of the
case at hand.
48. Ibid., p.-91.
Interestingly, in matters involving sexual harassment, Quebec has adopted a somewhat
different approach to the issue of employer liability. Employers are vicariously liable
for the acts of their employees under the rules of delict found in s. 1054 of the Civil Code
of Lower Canada: Halkett c. Ascofigex Inc., [1986] R.J.Q. 2697 (S.Ct.Qu6.); Foisy v.
Bell Canada, [1984] C.S. 1164 (S.Ct.Qu6.), rev'd on other grounds by [1989] RJ.Q.
521 (Que.C.A.). Contra: Commission des droits de la personne du Qudbec v. La
compagnie BombardierML.W. Ltie. (1983), 4 C.H.R.R. D/1447 (Prov.Ct.Qu6.).
But the practical consequences of the two regimes are the same: in both there is an
irrebuttable presumption of liability against the employer once it has been established
that sexual harassment has occurred in the workplace.
Ironically, this standard of liability has beenlimitedby statute in somejurisdictions: e.g.
s.48(5) of the Canadian Human Rights Act, amended after the complaint had been
todgedintRobichaud, ands. 44(l) of the Ontario HumanRights Code.Restrictions such
as these have prompted one board, in the case of Shaw v. Levac Supply Ltd. (1991), 14
C.H.R.R. D/36 (Ont. Bd.Inq.), p. 67 to note that:
[T]he only thing that its enactment may have accomplished is to shield such
artificial entities from liability for an entire range of unacceptable conduct for
which, but for that provision, they might now be held liable, thus relieving them
from having to provide a totally "healthy work environment".
49. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536; (1985), 7 C.H.R.R. D/3102.
50. Ibid., at p. 547.
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"Direct discrimination" has been defined as a "practice or rule which
on its face discriminates on a prohibited ground". 51 Mandatory retirement
policies, the refusal to rent to an individual because he is Black, or the
exclusion of women from jobs in a police department on the grounds that
"that is no place for a woman", are all examples of direct discrimination.
"Adverse effect discrimination" was applied and defined as follows by
the 0'Malley Court:
[T]here is the concept of adverse effect discrimination. It arises where an
employer for genuinebusiness reasons adopts a rule or standard which is
on its face neutral, and which will apply equally to all employees, but
which has a discriminatory effect upon a prohibited ground on one
employee or group of employees in that it imposes, because of some
special characteristic of the employee or group, obligations, penalties, or
restrictive conditions not imposed on other members of the work force.
52
It is worth emphasizing that cases involving "adverse effect
discrimination", also referred to as "indirect discrimination" or
"constructive discrimination", do not require evidence of a causal
connection between the prohibited ground and the act complained of. In
this respect the use of the word "because" is somewhat misleading for, if
taken literally, only cases involving direct discrimination would fit the
test:
If the courts become overly preoccupied with intent or with causation,
where the word "because" appears in the legislation being construed, the
desirable aims of the legislation may be thwarted, the beneficial effects
intended will be reduced, and more importantly, the legislative intent
contained in the preamble may not be given effect to.53
Rather, the plaintiff must show: i) the existence of a rule, policy or
practice, which ii) has a disproportionately negative effect on an individual
or group that is protected by legislation from discrimination. If the rule
cannot be shown to bejob related or otherwise necessary, it will be illegal.
51. Ibid., p. 551.
52. Ibid. See also Action Travaildes Femmes v. Canadian National, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114, p.
1137.
53. Ontario Human Rights Commission and O'Malley v. Simpson-Sears Ltd. (1982), 3
C.H.R.R. D/'96 (Ont. Div.Ct.), per Smith, J., in dissent, p. 802. Similarly, see C.N.R. v.
Canadian Human Rights Commission (1983), 4 C.H.R.R. D/1404, per LeDain, J., in dissent,
p. 1413: "I note also that the words 'because of' [...] did not prevent the Court from concluding
that the section permitted the application of the adverse effect concept." And further, "the
words 'on a prohibited ground' in section 10, which, in relation to effect, should be understood
as meaning by reason of a prohibited ground of discrimination." Contrary to O'Malley, the
decision in Bhinder was upheld by the the Supreme Court of Canada, but on different grounds:
Bhinder and the Canadian Human Rights Commission v. C.N.R., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 561.
See, also Robichaud supra, note 46, p.94.
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"Systemic discrimination", the third form of discrimination, was
described by Chief Justice Dickson in the case of Action Travail des.
Femmes in this way:
[S]ystemic discrimination in an employment contextis discrimination that
results from the simple operation of established procedures of recruitment,
hiring and promotion, none of which is necessarily designed to promote
discrimination. The discrimination is then reinforcedby the very exclusion
of the disadvantaged group because the exclusion fosters the belief, both
within and outside the group, that the exclusion is the result of "natural"
forces, for example, that women "just can't do the job" [...] To combat
systemic discrimination, it is essential to create a climate in which both
negative practices and negative attitudes can be challenged and
discouraged. 4
Systemic discrimination usually involves evidence that a protected
group is underrepresented in the defendant's institution or enterprise, and
that the underrepresentation is the cumulative result of rules, practices or
policies that are either directly discriminatory or have an adverse effect
on the given group. The Action travail des femmes decision in first
instance55 provides a text-book example of a case of systemic
discrimination involving proof based on statistics56 and anecdotal evidence.
It seems difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the elements of
liability that apply to "adverse effect discrimination" and "systemic
discrimination" with principles relating to the "duty of care", a test of
"foreseeability", the need to show a "desire to do harm" or the "knowledge
of the consequences of the act", which may very well be relevant to a
fault-based approach to liability, but not to proving discrimination.
7
A fault-based approach to discrimination implies additional proof
requirements and creates a "narrower scheme of liability"58 than that
which has been recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada. The narrow
approach is illustrated by the case of Ville de Quebec v. Commission des
54. Supra, note 52, p. 1139.
55. Action Travail des Femmes v. CN [1984],5 C.H.R.R. D/2327 (Can.Trib.)
56. Regarding the use of statistics see, for example, Blake v. Min. of Correctional Services
(1984), 5 C.H.R.R. D/2417;, Chapdelaine v. Air Canada (1988), 9 C.H.R.R. D/4449. The
admissibility of scientific and statistical data has also beenrecognized in cases involving direct
discrimination: E.g. Ont. Human Rights Commission v. Etobicoke (1982), 3 C.H.R.R. D1781,
and Hope v. The City of St. Catharines (1988), 9 C.H.R.R. D/4635.
Also, seeAidanR. Vining,DavidC. McPhillips, andAnthonyE. Boardman, "UseofStatistical
Evidence in Employment Discrimination Litigation", [1986] 64 Can. Bar Rev. 660.
57. In Robichaud, supra note 46, p. 96, the Court held that evidence aimed at showing that a
respondent had exercised due diligence could, at best "go to remedial consequences," but "not
liability."
58. Ibid., p. 94.
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droits de la personne, 59involving complaints brought by women guards
working in the city's female detention centre who sought to obtain equal
pay for work that was substantially the same as that of their male
colleagues. Although the court seemed to agree that there was no need to
prove intent,60 it relied on a narrow test of causation as the basis for
rejecting the women's claim:
[I]l incombe a celui qui se prdtend victime de discrimination de prouver un
lien de causalit6 entre 1'in6galit6 salariale dont il se plaint et le motif de
discrimination qu'il invoque. Le motif de discrimination doit 8tre la cause
efficiente de 1'in~galit. 6'
Requiring proof of causation or proof of a discriminatory fault will
lead to the very same difficulties as an approach based on intent. Indeed,
such proof requirements are little more than surrogates for intent. They
are likely to reduce the effectiveness of human rights legislation62 by
imposing proof requirements that may be"a virtually insuperablebarrier"
to establishing discrimination. In Ville de Quibec, the plaintiffs were
asked to show that a discriminatory motive had been the immediate cause
of the unequal system of pay, a task which was akin to searching for a
discriminatory needle in a haystack63 since the pay structure had been in
existence for some decades and had probably been exposed to a multitude
of factors which inevitably shaped and reshaped the system throughout
the years. Moreover, this restrictive approach is likely to exclude cases
where the discriminatory effects of a rule or policy are present, but where
discrimination is not necessarily the motivating factor. A "fault-based"
approach will simply fail to "respond adequately to the many instances
59. [1989] R.J.Q. 831 (Qud.C.A.).
60. Ibid., p. 841.
61. Ibid., p.842.
62. See also, Commission des droits de la personne du Quebec v. Pavilion St-Charles de
Limoilou (1983), 4 C.H.R.R. D1/1284 (Qud.S.Ct.), conf'd by the Quebec Court of Appeal,
Q.C.A. 200-09-000654-829, in an unreportedjudgement dated May 8,1985. Contra: Corp. des
Aliments Ault Lte. v. Senay, [1985] C.S. 1073.
The failure of the courts to give any meaning to the equal pay provisions of the Quebec Charter
has led the Human Rights Commission to recommend that the existing approach based on
complaints be replaced by a "pro-active" approach which would require employers to correct
pay inequities without waiting for a complaint.
63. Compare this with the approach in Re Attorney GeneralforAlberta and Gares (1976), 67
D.L.R. (3d) 635 (Alta. T.D.), p. 695, where the Alberta Supreme Court refused to be swayed
by arguments brought by the respondent that the differential in wages was due not to a
discriminatory intent but to the negotiation process and to the fact that the two groups of
employees were represented by separate bargaining units, and had been for many years: "It is
the discriminatory result which is prohibited and not a discriminatory intent."
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where the effect of policies and practices is discriminatory even if that
effect is unihtended and unforeseen."
64
It may, of course, be argued that there exists the possibility of an
overlap. But the element of fault is likely to appear in only a limited
category of discrimination cases, that is, in matters involving direct
discrimination. For instance, where acts are based on ill will or prejudice,
where there is a conscious decision to treat people differently by reason
of the group or class of persons to which they belong, or where sexual
harassment involves threats or actual acts of reprisal against the person
being harassed, such behaviour would probably meet the test of a
fault-based approach to discrimination. However, as was seen above,
there are many circumstances in which discrimination occurs either in the
absence of fault, or where it would be impossible to find evidence of fault
let alone identify the individual responsible for the fault.
Besides imposing additional proof requirements, the fault-based
approach may interfere with the effective enforcement of anti-
discrimination legislation in other ways. The evidentiary standards that
are used in discrimination law are essentially the same as those that apply
to civil cases under the general law. In all jurisdictions, including Quebec,
complainants carry the burden of proving discrimination according to the
ordinary civil standard of proof, i.e. on a balance of probabilities. Courts
and tribunals have also recognized that circumstantial evidence is an
important means of proving discrimination where direct evidence or
admissions are simply not available. 65 However, a fault-based approach
to discrimination, which puts emphasis on the reprehensible nature of
discriminatory practices, may lead trial judges to conclude that they are
"justified in scrutinizing evidence with greater care if there are serious
64. Supra, note 52, p. 1135.
65. See, forexample, Onischakv. British Columbia (1991), 13 C.H.R.R. D/87 (B.C. Council),
p. 89:
[A]n inference of discrimination may be drawn where the evidence offered in support
of it renders such an inference more probable than the other possible inferences or
hypotheses and the burden for establishing that other explanation rests with the person
whose conduct gives rise to the complaint.
For discussions regarding the elements required to make out a prima facie case of direct
discrimination, see:Israeli v. Canadian Human Rights Commission (1983), 4 C.H.R.R. D/
2147. See also Shakes v. Rex Pak Ltd., (1982), 3 C.H.R.R. D/1001, at p. 1002, and Pelletier
v. Marivtsan (1989), 10 C.H.R.R. D/5889, at p. 5890.
In Quebec, see Commission des droits de lapersonne du Qudbec v. Communautd Urbaine de
Montrdal, [1987] RJ.Q. 2024; (1988), 9 C.H.R.R. D/4466, p. 4467: "Tout en demeurant A
l'intdrieurdes limites des rfgles depreuve, il fautalors donnerpleine chanceA laddmonstration
des pr6somptions."
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allegations to be established by the proof that is offered."66 This approach
is open to severe criticism because it tends to be more concerned with
absolving the respondent of any wrongdoing in the absence of clear and
strong evidence of blameworthy behaviour, than withproviding adequate
"relief for victims of discrimination" as recommended by the O'Malley
court.67
The fault-based approach is also highly individualistic. It ignores the
fact that discrimination is essentially a group phenomenon and tends to
reduce the discriminatory act to an isolated incident between two specific
individuals, thereby denying the realities of institutional and structural
discrimination.6 Thus, one finds instances where courts have refused to
allow evidence of patterns of discrimination introduced to buttress an
66. Continental Insurance Co. v. Dalton Cartage Co.,[1982] 1 R.C.S. 164, p. 169.
67. In Forsyth v. The Corporation of the District ofMatsqui (1989), 10 CH.R.R. D/5854, the
respondent urged the Human Rights Council of British Columbia to assess the evidence in light
of the "gravity of the consequences of the findings upon the respondent." The Council refused
to adopt this punitive approach to discrimination preferring to rely on that developed in
O'Malley.
The same cannot be said of the Quebec decision in Commission des droits de lapersonne v.
C.U.M. (1983), 4 C.H.R.R. D/1302, at p. 1306, conf'd by the Court of Appeal, supra,note 65,
involving police brutality against a black man. Although the complainant was awarded $500.
for racist remarks made during the incident, the Superior court refused to find that the
unjustified beating was also discriminatory:
11 n'est pas permis, cornme semblait vouloir l'avancer la demanderesse, de souligner
certains agissements rdpr6hensifs de certains agents de police de fagon A ce que ces
fautes diteignent surtous les d6fendeurs afin de les tenirtous responsables. Ce n'estpas
parce qu'un agent aurait commis des fautes que tous doivent atre tenus responsables.
Onnepeutse contenterici deparler 'd'atmosphere.' 1lpeutetrementiolindici enrapport
aux coups portds A Th6ard que les paroles discriminatoires adress~es aux groupes de
noirs dontTh6ard ne faisait plus partienepeuventservirtprouverdiscrimination contre
ceux qui ont frapp6. Il aurait fallu qu'il soit prouv6 que ceux qui ont frapp6 sont ceux
qui ont prononc6 des paroles offensantes ou qu'ils 6taient pros de ceux qui ont parl6 et
les avaient entendus or 6taient pr6sum6s les avoir entendus presque au moment oil ils
ont frapp6:La situation fut assez confuse it ou pros de 1'entr6e du restaurant.
68. For a description of institutional discrimination which can be adapted to the Canadian
context, see Louis Knowles and Kenneth Prewitt, Institutional Racism in America (New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1969), pp. 142-43:
Maintenance of the basic racial controls is now less dependent upon specific
discriminatory decisions. Such behavior has become so well institutionalized that the
individual generally does not have to exercise a choice to operate in aracistmanner. The
rules and procedures of the large organizations have already prestructured the choice.
The individual only has to conform to the operating norm of the organization and the
institution will do the discriminating for him.
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individual complaint,69 or have made hard and fast distinctions between
"direct discrimination" and "systemic discrimination" resulting in the
loss of an otherwise legitimate right of redress.70
In closing on this section, it shouldbe added thatcourts in Quebec have
on occasion recognized the concept of adverse effect discrimination
under the Quebec Charter.71 However, this may have more to do with
recent developments in constitutional law and the post-Charter era than
with the influence of the laws of delict.72 It is further suggested that, since
fault remains the gravamen of delictual liability, it may well be necessary
for Quebec courts to reassess the relevance of the rules that govern
delictual liability when applying anti-discrimination legislation if they
are to deal with adverse effect and systemic forms of discrimination in an
effective and consistent manner. Fortunately, the courts in this province
have not rejected the O'Malley, Action travail desfemmes andRobichaud
trilogy of cases and, so far, we have been spared the futile task of dealing
with distinctions involving "fault-based discrimination", "no-fault-based
discrimination", and why not "strict liability discrimination", which
clearly have nothing to do with the manner in which discrimination law
has evolved in recent years.
3. Commercial freedom
To say that human rights legislation limits commercial freedom is to
state the obvious. Employers and landlords are not free to conduct their
business affairs as they please if, in doing so, they curtail the freedom of
others to participate as equals in society without discrimination based on
the group, category or class of persons to which they belong.
69. In Gaz Mitropolitain Inc. v. Commission des droits de la personne du Quibec, [1990]
R.J.Q. 1317 (Que. S.Ct.), (on appeal), the Court ordered the Conmiission to interrupt its
investigation regarding systemic discrimination and to limit its inquiry to the specific acts of
discrimination alleged in the individual complaint.
70. Toronto (City) Board of Education v. Quereshi (1991), 14 C.H.R.R. D/243, p. 247: "the
finding of discrimination made by the Board of Inquiry [...] was not the discrimination charge
that the Board of Education was asked to meet."
71. Attorney General of Quebec v. La Chaussure Brown's Inc., [1988) 2 S.C.R. 712, at p. 787 ;
Attorney General of Quebec v. Forget, [19881 2 S.C.R. 90, p. 102. But, see the early case of
Commission des droits de la.personne v. Ekco Canada Inc., [1983] C.S. 968.
72. In Johnson v. Commission des affaires sociales, [1984] C.A. 61, p.69, the Quebec Court
of Appeal remarked:
J'ajouterai que, peut-6tre paradoxalement, depuis l'entre en vigueur, il y aura bient~t
deux ans, de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertis, les tribunaux vont 8tre port6s
&t donner plus d'emphase A la charte du Qudbec et l'interprdter plus g~n~reusement."
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But, it is just as obvious that this feature upsets a basic tenet of the
common law.13 In early cases, freedom from discrimination almost
always collided with unlimited commercial freedom and the right to
property, aprinciple which went almostunquestioned before the enactment
of human rights legislation. "[Tihe general principle of the law", the
Supreme Court of Canada declared at the time, "is that of complete
freedom of commerce."7 4 Applying the common law, courts adopted a
strong laisser-faire policy where deference to economic and business
concerns was the rule, and respect for egalitarian values was the exception.
The low priority given to equality rights at common law and under the
civil law of Quebec in this respect is illustrated by cases such as Franklin
v. Evans75 and Loeiv's Montreal Theatres Ltd. v. Reynolds. 6 The latter is
a well-known case involving an individual who brought a civil action
against Loew's based on a breach of contract when he was denied the right
to select a place in the orchestra section and forced to sit in a separate
section reserved for Blacks. The Quebec Court of Appeal dismissed the
action and looked with favour on the economic arguments put forward by
the defence:
II estprouv6 que la pr6sence des Noirs dans les si~ges d'orchestreempeche
d'autres citoyens d'aller au th6etre et l'appelante n'est pas obligde de subir
une perte de revenus qui r6sulte de ce fait. [... ] Les propri6taires de theatre
ne sont pas obligs [... ] d'admettre des gens qui empecheraient leur
entreprise de r~ussir ou qui lui nuiraient financirement.77
In a criticism of Bhadauria, one commentator suggested that the
Supreme Court of Canada missed an opportunity to exploit the potential
of the common law by failing to adopt Dworkin's "superior model",
which essentially involves "balancing the competing claims of the
principles of 'freedom of contract' and 'freedom from discrimination' -.71
The competing-claims model may have provided an argument for that
commentator to try to open the common law door to equality rights cases,
but it says little about the relative weight that is to be given to each of these
73. W. S. Tarnopolsky, "The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove: Administration and Enforcement
of Human Rights Legislation in Canada" (1968), 46 Can. Bar Rev. 565, p. 567: "There can be
no denying that human rights legislation marks a clear departure from some formerly basic
common law rights".
74. Christie v. The York Corporation, [1940] R.C.S. 139, p. 142.
75. (1924), 55 O.L.R. 349
76. (1921), 30 B.R. 459.
77. Ibid., pp. 464-65.
78. McKenna, supra, note 14, p. 137.
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two freedoms. This concern is not exaggerated if one considers past
experience and also more recent examples where, even in the presence of
express anti-discrimination legislation, courts have chosen to subordinate
egalitarian values to property rights and economic considerations.
One finds, for instance, the 1981 case of Paquet9 in which an
individual complained of a landlord's refusal to rent an apartment to him
because he was on welfare and suffered from epilepsy. The court
dismissed the plaintiff's case and decided, on a narrow construction of the
law, that the plaintiff was not entitled to protection under the Charter
because he could neither be considered a "handicapped person" nor could
he claim to have a particular "social condition", despite the fact that the
exclusion was very much based on the complainant's status as a welfare
recipient. By characterizing freedom from discrimination as an "exception"
to the landlord's right to dispose of his property as he saw fit, the court
gave the defendant carte blanche to do as he pleased and relieved him of
the burden of giving some justification for the refusal. There seems to be
little in this approach to distinguish it from the reasoning that courts felt
free to adopt where there was a complete absence of legislation prohibiting
discriminatory practices of this nature. 0
Another example of this narrow approach to human rights legislation
can be found in a 1984 case which followed a public inquiry conducted
by the Quebec Human Rights Commission to investigate allegations of
racial discrimination in the Montreal taxi industry." The case ofProcureur
Gingral du Quibec v. Service de taxis Nord-Est (1978) Inc.82 involved a
Montreal taxi company which refused to refer calls to black drivers on the
basis of the preference expressed by certain customers for white drivers.
Justice Girouard of the Court of Sessions of the Peace made these remarks
about what eventually came to be known as the "next-in-line" policy:
Et que dire maintenant du droit de l'employeur qui n'apparait nulle part 4
la Charte qu6b~coise des droits et libert6s, mais qui est quand m~me un
droit r6el: celui d'exercer un commerce lui permettant de faire un profit
raisonnable pour assurer sa propre survie.
79. Commission des droits de la personne du Quebec v. Paquet, 119811 C.P. 78.
80. Ibid., p.82:
Donc, 'exception 4 ee principe de libert6 doit etre claire et nette et clairementjustifi~e.
Le lgislateur, par la charte, n'a voulu restreindre le droit de contracter librement, y
compris le droit de refuser de contracter, que dans les cas bien clairs et d6limitds de
discrimination contre la personne [...]
81. La Commission des droits de Ta personne du Quebec. Investigation into Allegations of
Racial Discrimination in the Montreal Taxi Industry. Final Report, October 1984.
82. (1984), 7 C.H.R.R. D/3109.
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On ne peutpas, dans les circonstances prdsentes, reprocherquoi que ce soit
it la compagnie poursuivie. On ne peut pas exiger qu'elle ait dO, en plus de
ses efforts d'intdgration, se charger A n'importe quel prix, de l'ducation
forcfe de la population. 3
The Quebec Superior Court reversed this decision on appeal,
unequivocally rejecting the defence based on customer preference and
economic freedom:
Si l'un des motifs retenus par le juge 6tait la n~cessit6 mon avis, ce
raisonnement ne peut etre accept6 en droit. Je trouve inconcevable que de
nos jours I'on puisse justifier un acte de discrimination fondfe sur la
couleur par des motifs mondtaires ou 6conomiques.
The Superior Court decision is more in keeping with the prevailing
view regarding the interpretation of anti-discrimination legislation. "We
should not search for ways and means to minimize those rights and to
enfeeble their proper impact." 5 This oft-quoted phrase describes, in a
nutshell, the "purposive approach" that the Supreme Court of Canada has
followed in a string of cases86 since that of Insurance Corporation of
British Columbia v. HeerspinkLs7 In this matter, the Court concluded that
an insurance company was not free to deny fire insurance coverage on the
basis of a "risk analysis" if the analysis was unreasonable and
discriminatory. The insurance company had refused to insure an individual,
once charged with trafficking in marijuana and thought therefore to
represent a "moral hazard" because "persons engaged in the drug trade
are unusually vulnerable to property damage and present an increased
risk to the property insurer." Denying the insurance company's right to
do as it pleased, Lamer J. declared that "[tihe Legislature [... ] has, as a
matter of policy, subjected to the Code the exercise of many traditionally
unhindered contractual rights [ ... ]," This gives us some indication of the
relative worth of equality and economics in discrimination cases.
But since discrimination is not an absolute right, further clarification
is needed. It is common practice for respondents to introduce legitimate
83. Ibid., p. 3112. In a similar vein, see La Reine v. Association Coopirative de Taxis de l'Est
de Montrdal (1984), 7 C.H.R.R. D/3115 (Ct. of Sess. of the Peace), rev'd by Justice Riopel of
the SuperiorCourt, in an unreported judgment dated December 1984. In St-Pierre etDumulong
v. Fernais Inc., (1976) C.S. 717, the Court declared: "En principe, au Quedbec, la libertd de
commerce existe et le marchand est libre de d~cideravec qui il contracte; ses motifs n'importent
pas. Les seules restrictions sont une prescription prfcise de la Loi ou une conduite contraire A
l'ordre public."
84. (1984) 7 C.H.R.R. D/3112, p. 3 114 .
85. In Action travail desfemmes, supra, note 52, p. 1134.
86. Craton, supra, note 33, O'Malley supra, note 49, Action travail desfemmes, ibid., and
Alberta Human Rights Commission v. CentralAlberta Dairy Pool, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489.
87. [1982] 2 S.C.R. 145, (1982), 3 C.H.R.R. D/1 163.
88. Ibid., at p. 1176.
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business concerns into evidence usually as part ofa defence ofjustification.
These defences, often referred to as "bonafide occupational qualification"
or "bona fide occupational requirement" defences, have the advantage of
bringing some degree of flexibility to the law and of ensuring fairness
towards respondents who have acted on the basis of legitimate grounds.
In finding the appropriate balance between the objective of providing
effective protection against discrimination, on the one hand, and ensuring
equitable treatment to respondents, on the other, past experience may be
instructive. The structure that is meant to protect against discrimination
may crumble like a pillar of salt if business and economic interests
become a dominant concern. In order to avoid such risks and adhering
once more to the purposive approach, the Supreme Court of Canada
decided, in Ontario Human Rights Commission v. The Borough of
Etobicoke, that "non-discrimination is the rule of general application and
discrimination, where permitted, is the exception."89 In other words,
under existing human rights legislation, the general principle of the law
is the opposite of what it was under the common law.
As for the appropriate standard of proof required to make out such a
defence, it has been held that "impressionistic evidence" does not suffice
and the defendant must show, on a balance of probabilities, that the
reasons for which a person has been denied a job or other benefit are
"related in an objective sense to the performance of the employment
concerned, in that it is reasonably necessary to assure the efficient and
economical performance of the job without endangering the employee,
his fellow employees and the general public." 90
There has been pressure to relax the Etobicoke test by replacing the
"reasonably necessary" criterion by one of simple "reasonableness". The
Ontario case of Zurich Insurance Company v. Ontario Human Rights
Commission,91 involving higher automobile-insurance premium rates for
young men under the age of 25 years of age, illustrates this approach.
According to the Divisional Court of Ontario, "[s]omething may be
reasonable without being necessary". 92 What appears to be a highly
subjective and discretionary standard in favour of the insurance industry
then follows: "[a] lthough these factors are notin themselves determinative
of the reasonableness of the classification, they do tend to show that there
is a common perception, shared by the industry and its regulators, of the
89. Supra, note 31, p. 208.
90. Ibid.
91. (1987), 8 C.H.R.R. D/4069 (Div. Ct.), conf'd by the Ontario Court of Appeal in an
unreported judgment dated October 19-20, 1989. The Supreme Court of Canada recently
confirmed the lower court rulings in a judgment, as yet unreported, dated June 25, 1992.
92. Ibid., p.4071.
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reasonableness of the classifications." 931It is suggested that to weaken the
Etobicoke test, for instance by placing greater emphasis on subjective
standards of justification or by introducing some degree of deference to
"business convenience",' is to increase the importance of commercial
freedom and to invite a corresponding decline in the protection against
human rights violations.
In closing on this section, it should be noted that, where discrimination
has been proved to their satisfaction, Quebec courts have also accepted
to adopt a narrow approach to defences under the Quebec Charter.
95 It
may, however, be said that this position is also in keeping with the general




[T]he size of awards is a problem, not just in sexual harassment cases, but
in all human rights case in Canada. Awards in human rights cases are not
a deterrent. They do not convince anyone that discrimination is important;
on the contrary, they demonstrate its insignificance.97
There is presently some disagreement regarding the standards which
would enable human rights boards to improve existing methods of
compensation for victims of discrimination. While some boards have
chosen to turn to the common law for guidance in assessing the quantum
of damages for lost wages, others have taken the opposite view. In Torres,
93. Ibid., p.4072.
94. Until recently the Supreme Court of Canada had resisted attempts to dilute the Etobicoke
test. See, in particular, The City of Saskatoon v. The Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission
and Craig, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1297; Central Alberta Dairy Pool, supra note 86; The City of
Brossard v. The Quebec Human Rights Commission, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 279. However, shortly
before the publication of this paper, the Court delivered its judgment in Zurich dismissing the
appeals. See Zurich Insurance Co. v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), judgment dated
June 25, 1992 (as yet unreported).
95. Ville de Lachine v. Commission des droitsde lapersonne du Quebec, [1984] C.S. 361, aff'd
by [19891 R.J.Q. 17, and Commission des droitsde la personne du Quebec v. Ville deBrossard,
supra note 94; Commission des-droits de la personne du Quebec v. College de Sherbrooke,
[1981] C.S. 1083; AssociationA.D.G.Q. v. C.E.C.M., [1980] C.S. 93 (on appeal).
96. Art. 1203 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada states that:
Art.1203. The party who claims the performance of an obligation must prove it.
On the other hand he who alleges facts in avoidance or extinction of the obligation
must prove them [...]
97. Shelagh Day, "Impediments to Achieving Equality", in Equality and Judicial Neutrality,
S. L. Martin and K. E. Mahoney, eds., (Toronto: Carswell, 1987), p. 405-06.
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the Board was favourable to the use of common law principles in this
context:
[W]hat is the durational extent to which general damages should be
ordered in effectuating compensation? There are analogous issues in tort
law and contract law, of course, where damages are limited to those
reasonably forseeable [sic] to the wrongdoer. It seems to me, at first
impression, that these principles are appropriate to awarding general
damages under the Code.9
But, in Cashin v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. (No.2),99 the Tribunal
rejected this approach declaring that "it seems on its face to be inappropriate
to apply the tort test of foreseeability to damages for discriminatory acts."
And, "one should not try to fit human rights remedies into inappropriate
legal doctrines."' 0
Without attempting to find a complete solution to the debate regarding
the appropriate standards to be used in compensating lost wages, there
would seem to be cogent reasons for holding that common law principles
and, in particular, the theory of reasonable notice are incongruous with
the nature of anti-discrimination legislation. Assuming that the purpose
of such legislation is to eliminate discrimination in employment, it is
logical to conclude that those who have been illegally excluded should be
placed in the position that they would have been in had there been no
discrimination.10 1 This principle can then be made subject to certain
qualifying features that are not incompatible with the legislation, such as
98. Torres v. Royalty Kitchenware (1982), 3 C.H.R.R. D/858, p. 872. See also, A.-G. Canada
v. McAlpine, [1989] 3 F.C. 530, (1990) 12 C.H.R.R. D/253; DeJager v. Canada (Dept. of
National Defence) (1987), 8 C.H.R.R. D/3963, p. 3966-67.
99. (1990), 12 C.H.R.R. D/222 (Can. Trib.).
100. Ibid., p. 233.
It may be said in passing that the case does not provide much guidance as to the criteria which
could effectively be used to determine the amount of damages that ought to be awarded where
the claim for lost wages is open-ended either because reinstatement is not requested or seems
inappropriate, or where the complainant has not succeeded in mitigating his or her damages.
Some cut-offpoint would seem necessary. It is interesting to note that in labour law the general
view is that the "the basic purpose of an award of damages is to put the aggrieved party in the
same position he would have been in had there been no breach of the collective agreement."
This is subject only to "three qualifying factors: the loss claimed must not be too remote", "the
aggrieved party must act reasonably to mitigate his loss", and "the damages mustbe certain and
not speculative." Brown and Beatty, Canadian Labour Arbitration, (Aurora: Canada Law
Book Inc., 3rd ed., 1991), # 2:1410.
101. For a criticism of the use of the "reasonable notice" standard in the context of
discrimination cases, see Whitehead v. Servodyne Canada Ltd. (1987), 8 C.H.R.R. D/3874, at
3877. Examples of cases which support the idea full compensation (restitutio in integrum) can
be foundinAirport Taxicab (Malton)Assn. v. Piazza (1989), 10C.H.R.R. D/6347 (Ont. C.A.);
(1989), 69 O.R. (2d) 281; and Gohm v. Domtarlnc. (1990), 12 C.H.R.RD/161 (Ont.Bd.Inq.);
Morgan v. Canada (A rmed Forces) (1991), 13 C.H.R.R. D/42 (Can. Rev. Tribunal).
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the duty to mitigate. This approach seems preferable to that of the
common law which is based on the right of employers to dismiss "at will",
on condition that appropriate notice be given.
In most jurisdictions, including Quebec, courts and tribunals will
award damages for humiliation and hurt feelings, although some
jurisdictions have chosen to put a "cap" on such damages. 102 They may
also award punitive or exemplary damages for discrimination that is
wilful or reckless.0 3 In Quebec, the authority to award punitive damages
for intentional discrimination under section 49 of the Charteris generally
seen as a clear derogation from civil law. °0
ii) Liability in cases involving mixed motives
In another vein, where a case of direct discrimination involves "mixed
motives", that is where the evidence shows that both a prohibited factor
and a lawful factor affected the act complained of, human rights tribunals
have adopted the approach developed by the arbitration decision in R. v.
Bushnell.l05 The general view is that, if discrimination affected the
decision-making process, that is sufficient to establish liability. The
respondent may then, but only in order to mitigate damages, introduce
further evidence to establish that the exclusion would have occurred
regardless of the discriminatory factor and for legitimate reasons: E.g.
Almeida v. Chubb Fire Security Division of Chubb Industries Ltd."6
This approach is a departure from the common law which tends to deny
liability where damages cannot be proved, and to emphasize the right to
compensation rather than the vindication of an individual's rights. l0 7
102. Man., s. 43(3) refers to a maximum award of $10,000; Ont. s. 40 (1) (b), allows up to
$10,000. for "mental anguish"; Fed., s.53 (3) allows up to $5,000. for "hurt feelings". A cap
on moral damages has been held to not discriminate: Canada Treasury Board v. Robichaud
(No. 2) (1990), 11 C.H.R.R. D/i 94, p.202 -0 3.
103. Fed., s.53(3); Ont., s.40(l)(b); Man., s. 43(3), allows up to 2,000. forexemplary damages.
104. Andr6 Morel, "La coexistence des chartes canadienne et qu6bdcoise: problmes
d'interaction" (1986), 17 R.D.U.S. 49, p.75.
105. (1974), 1 O.R. (2d) 442 (Ont. H. Ct.), at p. 447; aff'd by (1974), 4 O.R. (2d) 288 (Ont.
C.A.).
106. (1984), 5. C.H.R.R. D/2104, at p. 2113.
107. On this, see Marilyn L. Pilkington, "Damages as a Remedy for Infringement of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" [19841, 62 Can. Bar Rev. 517, pp. 535 ff.
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989), the United States Supreme Courtheld
that an employer could avoid liability where discrimination was a contributing factor but where
it has shown that it would have acted as it did anyway. It is interesting to note that the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 reverses this aspect of Price Waterhouse by amending s. 703 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and adding subsection (m) recognizing that an unlawful employment
practice is established where a prohibited ground is a "motivating factor, even though other
factors also motivated the practice."
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iii) Reinstatement
At common law, reinstatement has not generally been available. But
human rights tribunals have rarely hesitated in finding that they had the
power to order reinstatement where circumstances warranted such a
remedy. In Harrison v. The University ofBritish Columbia, 108 the tribunal
noted "that reinstatement is a primary remedy in situations involving
employment discrimination." 1°9
Attempts to prevent boards of inquiry from exercising this power have
not met with much success. The question was put before the Divisional
Court of Ontario in The Liquor Control Board of Ontario v. Ontario
Human Rights Commission. "I The L.C.B.O. appealed a decision of the
board of inquiry ordering that the complainant be awarded the position of
Director of Laboratory Services, a promotion which had been denied to
him on afew occasions because of race. The employer maintained that the
board had exceeded its authority but, speaking for the Court, Justice
Rosenberg thought otherwise:
It would, in my view, be contrary to the purposes of the Code to hold that
[the board] in order to 'achieve compliance with the Act did not have the
jurisdiction to place [the complainant] in the position that he should have
been placed in many years before.' The words of the section are broad
enough in providing that he may 'direct the party to do anything' to allow
him to directthe L.C.B.O. to replace [one employee with the complainant].' I
By contrast, the same issue ignited considerable controversy in Quebec.
Some courts viewed requests for the reinstatement of an employee, by
way of injunctive relief,"12as nothing short of heresy under the civil law
in light of the 1934 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Dupri
Quarries Ltd. v. Dupri.1"3 According to this reasoning such a remedy
could only be envisaged if allowed by clear and express legislative
language.
108. (1990), 12 C.H.R.R. D/303, rev'd on other grounds by the Supreme Court of Canada in
(1991), 13 C.H.R.R. D/317.
109. Ibid., p. 318.
110. (1988), 9 C.H.R.R. D/4868.
111. Ibid., p. 4874.
112. It should be noted that until recent amendments, the only way in which to obtain the
"cessation of the act complained of" or "the performance of an act" was to proceed by way of
injunction before the ordinary courts: Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, 1975
S.Q. c. 6, ss. 82 and 83.
113. [1934] S.C.R. 528.
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The debate gave rise to a series of contradictory decisions,' 14 creating
some disarray for ten years or so, until the Quebec Court of Appeal
decided, in 1987, to settle the issue in Commission des droits de la
personne v. Alcan Ltie."5 The Court rejected the civil law approach and
turned instead to a "purposive approach" to human rights legislation.
Justice Dub6 said this:
Ala lecture deces articles, il apparaitque le l6gislateuraentendu soustraire
du regime de droit commun, le recours en injonction de l'article 83 [de la
Charte]. De fait, l'article 16 prohibe la discrimination dans l'embauche
alors que l'article 49 prfvoit le droit d'une victime d'obtenir la cessation
d'une atteinte ses droits protdgfs par la Charte. En l'esp~ce et en de
pareils cas, je suis convaincu qu'une telle cessation ne peut etre obtenue
que par une injonction enjoignant A l'employeur fautif d'embaucher le
postulant victime de discrimination.'
6
It may well be, as some authors have suggested,1 7 that cases such as
Alcan may eventually contribute to the development of the civil law on
such issues as the right to seek reinstatement by way of injunctive relief.
But the corollary of this proposition is that the development of
discrimination law is then subordinated to the sluggish pace with which
the civil law and the common law tend to progress. This hardly seems a
justified or necessary restriction on the application of human rights
legislation in Canada today.
On the basis of this overview, one may conclude that the law of
discrimination has evolved in a manner that is at times compatible with
established common law principles, but most often is not. To this extent,
the Supreme Court of Canada's refusal in Bhadauria to treat the right to
nondiscrimination as part of the common law appears, with the benefit of
hindsight, to have been a judicious choice. Unfortunately, the same
cannot be said of other aspects of the 1981 judgment.
114. The following cases recognized the right to reinstatement under the Quebec Charter:
Martin v. Jobin et al., S.C.Q. 200-05-001185-854, delivered July 23, 1985 (unreported);
Blanchette v. Cogera Inc. (1980),7 C.H.R.R. D/3355; Le Pritre v.Auberge des Gouverneurs
(1980), 7 C.H.R.R. D/3356; Gagnon v. Brasserie La Bulle Inc. (1981), 7 C.H.R.R. D/3357.
Contra: Commission des droits de lapersonne v. Cie Price Ltje., J.E. 81-866; Commission des
droits de lapersonne du Quebec v. Alcan Ltie (1983) 4 C.H.R.R. D/1614, rev'd on appeal in
[1987] D.L.Q. 340 (Qu6.C.A.).
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid., p. 345.
117. Marie-France Bich, "Du contrat individuel de travail en droit qu6becois: essai en forme
depoint d'interrogation" (1985), 17R.G.D. 85;Audet, BonhommeandGascon,Lecongdiement
en droit quibicois, (Cowansville: Les 6ditions Yvon Blais Inc., 3rd ed., 1991), # 2:6.4, p. 2-51.
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III. Exclusive Jurisdictions, Human Rights Commissions and Tribunals:
The Vexing Issue of the Limited right to Seek Redress for Discrimination.
In Bhadauria Chief Justice Laskin made the following remarks:
The comprehensiveness of the Code is obvious from this recital of its
substantive and enforcement provisions. There is a possibility of a
breakdown in full enforcement if the Minister refuses to appoint a board
of inquiry where a complaint cannot be settled and, further, whether
penalties on prosecution will be sought also depends on action by the
Minister. I do not, however, regard this as supporting (and no other support
was advanced by the respondent) the contention that the Code itself gives
or envisages a civil cause of action, whether by way of election of remedy
or otherwise. The Minister's discretion is simply an element in the
scheme."18
(emphasis is mine)
Breakdown indeed. Admittedly, the decision can be seen as an act of
judicial deference towards specialized human rights bodies. However, to
deprive individuals of the right to seek redress for acts of discrimination
unless they have the support of governmental authorities, is quite another
matter.
In discussing the procedural consequences of Bhadauria, it once more
seems appropriate to distinguish between two separate issues: (A) the
right of individuals to seek redress for discrimination irrespective of an
administrative decision allowing the recourse, and (B) the merits of
specialized human rights tribunals.
Recent developments regarding the nature and the extent of the
procedural obligations of human rights commissions tend to reinforce
objections against the present system of exclusive jurisdictions. In
Syndicat des employis de production du Quebec et de l'Acadie v.
Canadian Human Rights Commission,119 a case involving complaints
based on the right to equal pay for work of equal value, the complainants
sought judicial review when the Canadian Human Rights Commission
"chose not to give reasons for its decision to dismiss the complaint as
unsubstantiated." The Supreme Court of Canada held, in a majority
judgment, that the "decision of the Commission was not one that was
required to be made on a judicial or quasi-judicial basis." Consequently,
when deciding whether or not to take a matter before a tribunal, the
Commission was essentially exercising "administrative functions not
subject to the requirements of natural justice." 120
118. Supra, note 11, p. 188.
119. [1989] 2 S.C.R. 879.
120. Ibid., p.900.
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In short, while the Commission has the duty to act fairly121 during its
investigation, it is not bound by the full panoply of natural justice rules:
for instance, it need not give parties the opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses'22 nor is it expected to conduct a hearing in the presence of the
parties concerned.
Such procedural standards would not be unreasonable if alternate
means of redress were available orif the right to a hearing were eventually
guaranteed. But, surely, there is an. absence of fair play where the
organization has a final say in whether the matter should or should not be
taken through a process of adjudication. It is a system which deprives
complainants of a right to a hearing before their rights are determined. It
is a system which creates a double standard because respondents, but not
complainants, are entitled to a hearing and often the possibility of an
appeal before their rights or obligations are ultimately decided. Ironically,
the group of individuals that are likely to be penalized in this fashion are
the very same groups that human rights laws are meant to protect from
discrimination. Itis a system which appears to be in complete contradiction
with judicial statements regarding the value of equality rights under the
constitution and the principles enunciated in Andrews: 123
Discrimination is unacceptable in a democratic society because it epitomizes
the worst effects of the denial of equality ..... discrimination reinforced
by law is particularly repugnant. The worst oppression will result from
discriminatory measures having the force of law. It is against this evil that
s. 15 provides a guarantee.
24
It is, lastly, a system which provides a right but not necessarily a
remedy, and a well-known dictum holds that it is "a vain thing to imagine
a right without a remedy; for (a) want of right and want of remedy are
reciprocal". 12 5
This criticism should not be understood as a desire to undermine
human rights commissions which have a legitimate and, I believe,
important mandate to carry out in education, the investigation of
complaints, the settlement of complaints where possible, and the
availability of free legal help where the commission considers that the
121. Nicholson v. Haldiman-Norfolk Regional Board of Commissioner of Police, [1979] 1
S.C.R. 311; Selvarajan v. Race Relations Board, [1976] 1 All E.R. 12.
122. But, see Cashin v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1984] 2 F.C. 209 (Fed. C.A.).
123. Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
124. Reference Re an Act to Amend the Education Act (1986), 53 O.R. (2d) 513, at p. 554 , as
quoted in Andrews, ibid., p.171.
125. Ashby v. White (1703), 2 Ld. Raym. 938, p. 953, as quoted in Bhadauria, supra note 12,
p. 201.
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case should go forward. But where the commission is not prepared to take
a matter further, complainants should have the option of pursuing their
case alone.
This proposal is not new. 126 However, most commentators seem to be
of the opinion that, in the event of legislative reform, such an option could
adequately be exercised by means of a civil action before the ordinary
courts. To exclude the possibility of exercising this option before a
specialized human rights forum is, in my view and in light of the
discussion in the first part of this paper, a mistake.
Human rights tribunals have contributed considerably to the
development of a coherent and detailed system of legal principles aimed
at ensuring the effective enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation.
The Supreme Court of Canada could probably not have formulated its
approach to equality rights in O'Malley, Action travail des femmes,
Robichaud and Andrews, without the preparatory work and analysis of
human rights boards.127 Furthermore, despite the important theoretical
advances that these cases represent, there now seems to be a great deal of
confusion regarding the proper application of the concepts of "adverse
effect discrimination" and "systemic discrimination". Expert chairs are
probably in a better position than the courts to unravel some of these
difficulties and to bring greater coherence to this area of the law.
Hopefully, they will also be more successful in avoiding reliance on
"intent surrogates" which have appeared in the case law with unexpected
frequency. This is in reference to a cluster of cases in which an "effects"
analysis would have been appropriate but where adjudicators have,
wittingly or unwittingly, resorted to standards that are more suited to
intentional discrimination by requiring, for instance, evidence of a
"causal link" between the discriminatory motive and the act complained
of, 2 a "connection between the characteristic [...] and the different
126. See, supra, notes 14 and 15.
127. See, for instance, the cases considered by the O'Malley Court.
128. See, supra, note 58 and accompanying text. And also, Toronto (City) Board ofEducation
v. Quereshi, supra, note 70, p. 246: "it cannot be said that [the complainant's] interviewers
failed to give him thejob because he was from Pakistan. They did not give him thejob because
they thought someone else could do a better job." But, as Campbell J. points out in dissent, at
page 250, "the intuitive preference for the outgoing excited enthusiasm of the less qualified
candidate was not found on the evidence to be objectively justified."
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treatment", 2 9 or proof that the respondent was "singling out" protected
group members for negative treatment. 130
Specialized human rights tribunals are also more likely to resist
common law influences than the ordinary courts which are accustomed
to applying the general law on a day to day basis and are therefore more
likely to incorporate such influences into every facet of the
decision-making process.
As onejudge put it, "[t]he Legislative Assembly decided that it wanted
these decisions to be made in the first and crucial fact-finding instance
by expert tribunal chairs [... I and not by judges [... ]."I31 If anything, this
part of the legislative scheme should be reinforced.
The Quebec legislature refused for many years to consider the
possibility of creating a specialized human rights tribunals. However,
today it provides an interesting model in this respect. The Quebec Human
Rights Tribunal, established under s. 100 of the Charter offHuman Rights
129. DartmouthHalifax County Regional Housing Authority v. Att.Gen. of Nova Scotia,
decision of the Halifax County Court, dated April 13, 1992, as yet unreported, p. 2 6.
130. Romano v. BoardofEducationforthe City ofNorth York (1987), 8 C.H.R.R. D/4347, aff d
by (1989), 10 C.H.R.R. D/5807 (Ont. S. Ct.), affd by (1989), 10 C.H.R.R. D/5807 (Ont. Div.
Ct.). At p. 4358: "The requirements of the respondent Board are not designed and do not have
the impact of singling out any particular group."
Similarly, see LeDeuffv. The Canadian Employment and Immigration Commission (1986), 8
C.H.R.R. D/3692, in which a Tribunal found that discrimination had not occurred when the
complainant was contacted by an official of CEIC wishing to locate immigrants who had
engaged in illegal acts in Canada on the basis that he had a"foreign-sounding" name, a criterion
systematically relied upon by the official in question. According to the Tribunal, discrimination
had not taken place because the official did not single out any one particular national origin,
race or ethnic group. Fortunately, this decision was reversed by a Review Tribunal in (1989),
9 C.H.R.R. D/4479, at p. 4487, on the grounds that the interpretation of the law was too
restrictive.
See also, Belya v. Statistics Canada (1990), 11 C.H.R.R. D/308 (Can. Trib.), p.322: "An
employment practice can only be classified as discriminatory which singles out an individual
or group of individuals for adversme treatment [...J"
Other boards have been quick to react to the questionable approach relied in these cases:
The test articulated in Romano, [...] is that the respondent's policies have the impact of
,singling out [a] particular group' such as South Asians. With respect, I do not accept
that the evidence need go that far. It ought to be sufficient for the identified group to
show that policies impact adversely on that group or any other group of persons sharing
the same cultural characteristics who are identified by a prohibited ground of
discrimination.
Bhadauria v. Toronto (City) Bd. of Education (1990), 12 C.H.R.R. D1105 (Ont.Bd.), p.135.
The reasoning of Rdmano was also rejected in Gajecki v. Surrey SchoolDistrictNo. 36 (1990),
11 C.H.R.R. D/326, p.332 (B.C.Council).
131. Toronto (City) Board of Education v. Quereshi, supra, note 70, p. 248 .
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and Freedoms, is a permanent tribunal composed of Quebec Courtjudges
having experience and expertise in matters involving human rights.
132
Presiding judges who have the power to decide cases alone are assisted
by two assessors. 13  Most importantly for our purposes here, while "only
the commission may initially submit an application to the Tribunal",
sections 84 and 111 of the Charter allow complainants to take their case
before the Tribunal personally should the Commission decide that it is not
interested in pursuing the matter any further. Section 84 reads as follows:
Where, following the filing of a complaint, the commission exercises its
discretionary power not to submit an application to a tribunal to pursue, for
a person's benefit, a remedy provided forin section 80 to 82, it shall notify
the complainant of its decision, stating the reasons on which it is based.
Within 90 days after he receives such notification, the complainant may,
at his own expense, submit an application to the Human Rights Tribunal
to pursue such remedy and, in that case, he is, for the pursuit of the remedy,
substituted by operation of law for the commission with the same effects
as if the remedy had been pursued by the commission.
While it may be too early to assess the effectiveness of this new
Tribunal, there are indications that by giving individuals access to a
specialized tribunal and one which is not only less costly but also less
formal than the ordinary courts,134the legislation is meeting an important
need in the community.1
35
IV. Conclusion
Despite the reservations that one may have regarding certain consequences
of Bhadauria and, in particular, the limited right of individuals to seek
redress for acts of discrimination, it is a ruling that remains significant
with respect to the effective application and enforcement of human rights
legislation. The view that specialized human rights tribunals may provide
a better forum than the courts for discrimination cases in first instance is
as valid today as it was when contemporary human rights legislation was
first enacted in the 1960s. In addition, the Supreme Court of Canada chose
a positive course in refusing to incorporate the right to nondiscrimination
into the common law.
132. S. 101.
133. S. 104.
134. It should be noted that under s. 49 of the Quebec Charter an individual always has the
option of taking a civil action for discrimination before the ordinary courts.
135. According to information provided by the Human Rights Tribunal, approximately one
third of its case load involves requests brought by individuals rather than the comin-ssion.
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In the years that have followed the Court's decision in Bhadauria it has
become increasingly clear that although common law principles may
provide some guidance, by way of analogy, in determining discrimination
cases, they must also be treated with caution if one is to ensure the
coherent and effective development of discrimination law. Although
common law principles may often seem neutral in appearance, they did
not evolve in a vacuum; they form part of a network of rules which have
been crafted, not to support social legislation, but to uphold a system of
law in which commercial freedom is a dominant value to which the right
to equality has regularly been subordinated.
In 1975, referring to the Canadian Bill of Rights in Hogan v. The
Queen, 136 Chief Justice Laskin defined the term "quasi-constitutional" as
a "half-way house between a purely common law regime and a
constitutional one." The Bill of Rights was a patent failure before the
courts. If human rights legislation is to enjoy a better fate, then it will be
necessary to attach concrete and not only symbolic value to the priniciple
that, while not quite constitutional in character, this is legislation of a
special nature. And, does discrimination law have anything in common
with the common law? Not much.
136. [1975] 2 S.C.R. 574, p. 597.
